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Chowdhury (1988) adopts an alternative technique to test for causality between 
expenditures and receipts of state and local governments and claims that he ob- 
tains results that are different from those reported in our 1987 paper (Marlow 
and Manage, 1987). We disagree with many of his criticisms. In this reply, we 
argue that he misinterprets our results and policy implications and that his 
results are really not much different from ours; in fact, sometimes his results 
provide stronger support of our hypothesis. 
Optimal lag length 
Chowdhury criticizes our estimation procedure which utilizes symmetric lags 
from two to five periods as arbitrary. We make two points. One, we did not 
arbitrarily choose a single lag structure but analyzed the causal patterns over 
a relatively long range (up to five years). In the univariate and multivariate 
equations estimated by Chowdhury, the lag length which minimizes the Final 
Prediction Error (FPE) is selected by varying the lag length from 1, ..., n 
(where n = 5 in Chowdhury's paper). However, if the selected lag length equals 
n or is very close to n, the literature suggests that the search of lag length be 
extended beyond n in order to determine if the optimal lag is greater than n. 
In the regressions with local government revenues as the dependent variable, 
Chowdhury selects a four period lag. However, lag lengths exceeding five peri- 
ods are 'arbitrarily' not examined to check if the FPE can be lowered by includ- 
ing lags greater than five. While Chowdhury claims to use the FPE criterion 
to avoid arbitrariness, his analysis should also include these checks for optimal 
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lag length. He justifies his choice of n = 5 by using the rationale provided by 
Blackley (1986). We argue that our choice of restricting the lag lengths up to 
five periods is also based on similar reasoning and is not any more arbitrary 
than his method. Ram (1988) argues '... the experimental evidence provided 
by Guilkey and Salemi (1982) seems important enough to justify the use of 
preassigned lag lengths in the vicinity of what gave good results in their ex- 
periments.' 
Two, with respect to symmetric lags, Chowdhury argues that they may result 
in overspecification or underspecification of the lag length and thereby result 
in either inefficient or biased estimates. In order to determine whether this is 
true, we attempted to compare our results with those reported by Chowdhury. 
However, there appears to exist a discrepancy between the lag lengths in three 
of the four regressions (Chowdhury, Table 4), and the reader is left to wonder 
if this comment is based on the lag forms reported in Table 2 or Table 4. For 
example, in his regression with state expenditure as the dependent variable, it 
is not clear if a (1,3) lag (i.e., the RHS of the equation includes a one period 
lag for expenditures and three lagged values for receipts) or a (1,4) lag structure 
is selected. He finds a unidirectional causal relation between state revenues and 
expenditures which is the same result we obtained when we used (3,3) and (4,4) 
lag structures. In fact, in seven of the eight bivariate equations we estimated, 
we obtain the same result as Chowdhury. Accordingly, we suggest that our use 
of symmetrical ags does not pose serious problems. 
Serial correlation 
Contrary to Chowdhury's criticism, we transformed the variables into their 
natural logarithms. The diagnostic tests we used to check for serial correlation 
consisted of estimating autoregressions on the residuals obtained from the esti- 
mated regressions. Similar diagnostic checks have been used by other research- 
ers (Mehra, 1979; Williams et al., 1976; and Manage and Marlow, 1986). While 
one may argue that Chowdhury's point on the determination of trend- 
stationarity and difference-stationarity is interesting, we argue that use of one 
approach over the other is more subjective than objective. Moreover, given the 
similarity in our results, we find it difficult to claim that Chowdhury's ap- 
proach is either superior or necessary for the correct transformation of our 
data set. 
Results at the local level of government 
Chowdhury argues that he obtains different results at the local level of govern- 
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that the level of aggregation exerts no potential impact on the local government 
results. For each bivariate equation, Chowdhury determines the lag length for 
the lagged dependent variable on the RHS and for the independent variable. 
He determined four lag lengths for the local level of government since he esti- 
mates two bivariate equations (see his Table 4) - one with expenditures and 
one with receipts as the dependent variable. Of these four, the length of three 
lags is two periods or less and the fourth lag equals three periods (Table 4). On 
the basis of these lags, he finds a feedback relation between expenditures and 
receipts. However, it is important to note that these interactions are observed 
for very short lag lengths. For the shortest lag structure (two periods) used in 
our study (which is close to the lag structure derived on the basis of the FPE 
criterion), we found that revenues cause expenditures, but expenditures do not 
cause revenues. Apparently, Chowdhury, by ignoring our results for the short- 
est lag structure, incorrectly restricts his comparison by considering only the 
longer lags where we do not detect causality. We observed at the shortest lag 
structure, '... the one case where significant causality is observed lends some 
empirical support for the hypothesis that tax receipts support spending' (p. 
251). Contrary to Chowdhury's claim, we are not arguing that local expendi- 
tures and revenues are independent of one another. Since we observed causality 
at the shorter lag, we argue that we need to be concerned about these inter- 
actions. 
We disagree with Chowdhury's claim that our results for the longer lag struc- 
tures can be attributed only to our methodology and are in no way influenced 
by aggregation problems. We feel that this claim is naive. Given the many 
diverse constraints affecting the financing of the myriad of local governments, 
it is difficult to argue that each locality is just another 'apple' in the barrel. 
Rather, the barrel is probably loaded with many apples, oranges, bananas .... 
Given these data problems, we argue that policy implications stemming from 
our results at the local level of government should require much scrutiny. In 
effect, this is just another application of the well-known aggregation problem 
in macroeconomics. 
Conclusion 
It is worth repeating that causality testing is a very complex task. The diversity 
of views on interpreting the definition of causality and on the methods for test- 
ing causality highlight this issue. In our study, we cite an excellent article which 
provides a detailed critique of various problems associated with causality tests 
(see Conway, et al., 1984). It would appear that Chowdhury's comment draws 
very strong conclusions and fails to consider some of the complex theoretical 
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issues regarding causality tests as well as important data problems pertaining 
to state and local governments. Moreover, we find it somewhat curious that, 
given the strong similarities in our two studies, Chowdhury prefers to dwell on 
the mechanics of an alternative technique rather than concentrate on the fact 
that his alternative technique yields supporting results to our 1987 paper on the 
tax-spend hypothesis. 
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